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The preferences of private equity investors in selecting 
target acquisitions: An international investigation 
Abstract 
This study investigates the characteristics and attributes that private equity investors prefer 
when selecting target acquisitions. These characteristics are examined against a matched 
sample of firms subject to corporate acquisitions via tender/merger offer during 2000-2009, 
across seven countries: Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the USA, France, 
Germany, and Sweden. We show that firm specific characteristics are more influential in 
target selection than external or institutional variables.  In particular, private equity targets 
exhibit lower stock volatility and long-term growth prospects, are larger, and  have greater 
abnormal operating income relative to tender/merger offer target firms. Further, private 
equity bidders’ exhibit “home bias”, implying that familiarity motivates target selection. 
Institutional factors remain largely insignificant across all tests. 
 
Keywords: private equity, mergers, tender offers, acquisition techniques, economic cycles, 
regulatory environment, legal origin, equity home bias.  
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1. Introduction   
Private equity has grown into a valuable asset class in capital markets, and 
regulators acknowledge that such acquisitions “help to promote an efficient, dynamic and 
innovative business sector” (Reserve Bank, 2007, p 66). This paper investigates, across a 
sample of countries, the characteristics and attributes that private equity investors prefer 
when selecting target acquisitions. In particular, these include firm specific characteristics 
such as financial and performance measures, as well as external or institutional 
determinants, such as jurisdiction. These characteristics are examined against a matched 
sample of firms subject to corporate acquisitions via tender/merger offer during 2000-2009, 
across seven countries: Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the USA, France, 
Germany, and Sweden.  
In addition, this paper investigates whether private equity bids exhibit home bias 
across countries, and within the United States. Equity home bias refers to the observed 
phenomenon that investors prefer local market securities, and has been labelled a ‘puzzle’ 
in prior literature (Warren, 2010). As private equity funds are sophisticated investors, and 
considering the result in French and Poterba (1991),which shows that U.K., Japanese and 
U.S. investors heavily overweight their portfolios in their home market; a useful extension 
conducted in this study is an examination of whether such bias exists in the market targeted 
by private equity.  
A broad literature considers target firm characteristics surrounding mergers and 
acquisitions (Singh, 1975; Kuehn, 1975; Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Palepu, 1986; 
Chatterjee, 2000; Alcade and Espitia, 2003; and Siriopoulos et al., 2006), however scant 
attention has been paid to target firm characteristics of private equity bid target firms 
relative to other acquisition techniques (Chapple et al., 2010). Prior studies also present 
conflicting findings on the importance of target firm-specific characteristics in determining 
the probability of a merger or acquisition. Further, little prior research investigates such 
characteristics in a cross-country setting, instead being limited to a single, or several 
markets. For example, Siriopoulos et al. (2006) and Chatterjee (2000) find that acquirers 
prefer larger, mature targets with high productivity in Greece and the United Kingdom. 
Singh (1975) and Kuehn (1975), Palepu (1986) and Alcade and Espitia (2003) find that 
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smaller firms with lower profitability and market to book ratios have a higher probability of 
a bid (relative to other potential target firms) in the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Spain.  
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, little attention has been 
directed to the firm-specific characteristics of target firms subject to a private equity bid. 
While recent literature has considered the target firm-specific characteristics of private 
equity bids in an Australian context (Chapple et al., 2010), this study extends prior 
literature to consider these characteristics relative to tender/merger offers on an 
international basis across seven countries listed on the FTSE Global Equity Index Series 
financial market list with a free and well-developed equity market. These countries 
represent a sample covering both common and civil law legal systems. The difference 
between common law and civil law systems, as it relates to securities investment, is 
significantly related to, for example, the strength of investor protection (La Porta et al., 
1998).  Whether the strength of the investor protection provided in a market is a priority to 
sophisticated investors such as private equity investors is a useful distinction to make when 
investigating investor preferences.  
Second, this study examines the effect of country-specific characteristics such as 
legal indices, interest rates and business cycles on financial markets in a private equity 
context. Foster et al. (2012) highlight the importance of country-specified variables in 
capital markets research. Their study examines equity valuation multiples in a global 
setting. It uses 22 variables intended to capture country-by-country differences according to 
four general categories: ‘economy related’, ‘capital market related’, ‘legal/political-related’ 
and ‘financial reporting regime–related’ factors. In our study, we have focused more on the 
legal/political related factors. Finally, we examine the proximity of a bidder to its target, to 
isolate the existence of any home bias.  
We find that targets chosen for acquisition by private equity firms exhibit lower 
stock volatility, lower ex-ante long-term growth prospects, are larger, and exhibit greater 
abnormal operating income relative to tender/merger offer target firms. After controlling 
for fixed effects and sensitivity to variable selection, the results are robust to alternate 
specifications. In addition, the results indicate private equity firms exhibit equity home bias 
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in their target selection. Although the results reveal the economic business cycle, interest 
rate and legal jurisdiction of the target firm country to be insignificant determinants of 
target firm choice, the pooled sample descriptive statistics indicate a greater number of 
bids/offers in common law jurisdictions and an increase in bids/offers during peak 
economic cycles resultant from lowered costs of borrowing. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the background, 
market, and institutional framework for private equity acquisitions. Section 3 develops the 
theory suggesting the macro and firm level characteristics peculiar to private equity targets. 
Section 4 details the empirical design, followed by section 5, which covers the data. Section 
6 presents the results, and section 7 concludes. 
2. Background 
Private equity investment involves the acquisition of long-term growth potential 
target firms, with the aim of restructuring the firm to improve its value. The restructure 
involves both an injection of finance, and stewardship (Black and Gilson, 1998). At the end 
of its investment horizon, the private equity investor aims to divest the firm at a higher 
value, concurrently generating wealth for the investors and employees of the restructured 
target firm. This makes private equity investment not only potentially advantageous for 
investors, but also the target firm, as it introduces skilled management to identify potential 
risks, and enhance the efficiency and profitability of the acquired firm. Furthermore, post 
privatisation management are able to focus on restructuring the organisation without the 
obligation to conform with transparency standards, and reporting standards set by 
regulatory bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) in the United 
States. Using US data, McKenzie and Janeway (2011) show that the public equity market 
substantially influences private equity returns on exit: in favourable conditions, an IPO is 
associated with a median internal rate of return of 76%.   
The period 2006-2007 saw increased private equity investment within Australia and 
internationally, with private equity deals such as Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, 
Coles Myer, and the abandoned Qantas takeover, prominent in the Australian press. The 
2007 buyout industry exhibited conditions never before seen by investors, with fund sizes, 
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returns and access to capital at all-time highs.
2
 This increase in private equity dealings saw 
private equity account for 25 percent of the global mergers and acquisitions deal value by 
July 2007, and 35 percent of the mergers and acquisitions deal value in the United States, 
with private equity investment reaching a peak in 2007. However, the boom in private 
equity investment was short-lived, with the 2007 Credit Crunch, 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis, and a reduction in market confidence decreasing investment activity sharply. 
Shareholders increased their risk aversion, and the global private equity market contracted 
by 40 percent to $190 billion in 2008. This decrease continued during the first half of 2009, 
which saw $24 billion in private equity acquisitions – a sixth the size of activity a year 
earlier.. As the buyout industry continues to experience renewed growth ahead of the 
recovering venture capital industry, we are now anticipating what can be described as the 
fourth private equity boom and bust cycle resulting since the Global Financial Crisis. In 
light of this behaviour, private equity investment has drawn attention from the regulators, 
for example in the UK and Australia, about the role and impact of this style of acquisition 
on the capital markets. Hence it is timely, in the time of reduced activity, to investigate 
these types of deals and investor preferences. For this reason, we examine acquisitions 
during the period 2000 – 2009. 
3. Theory and hypothesis development 
The relation between private equity bid determinants at the firm and country level 
compared to other merger and acquisition technique determinants remains a topical field of 
discussion amongst academics, practitioners and regulators. A recent study by Chapple et 
al. (2010) provides evidence of the link between private equity bids and accounting 
information within Australia. They find target-specific characteristics (e.g.larger size of the 
target firm, greater financial stability, greater free cash flows, lower growth) to be 
positively associated to the probability of a private equity bid relative to a benchmarked 
sample of merger/takeover targets. The findings within Chapple et al. (2010) are supported 
in a US context by Boone and Mulherin (2009), Bargeron et al. (2008) and by Achleitner et 
al. (2010) and De Maeseneire and Brinkhuis (2012) for continental Europe. These studies 
                                                 
2 The Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited. Thomson Financial and Australian 
Venture Capital Association Limited Survey Fiscal Year Ended June 30 2007. 
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find that in addition to the information relevance of reported financials such size and 
leverage, other firm-specific characteristics such as corporate governance mechanisms and 
agency problems (represented by managerial ownership concentration, the presence of 
blockholders,  bid competition and free cash flows) play a significant role in private equity 
bids and bid premiums. Further, Bargeron et al. (2008) draw on the increased media 
attention of private equity investments and justifications therein to provide systematic 
evidence on private equity acquisitions. 
This paper extends upon the above studies to incorporate an international sample, in 
order to test the notion that private equity targets have greater financial slack, greater 
financial stability, greater free cash flows and lower measurable growth prospects 
compared to tender/merger offer target deals. Further, country level factors are likely to 
affect private equity activity and these factors are tested in the models used. The following 
sections provide the theoretical underpinning for these hypotheses. 
3.1 Financial slack 
Prior literature provides conflicting evidence on the financial slack of the acquirer 
and target firms at the bid date. Nevertheless, consensus exists that firms with opposite 
growth- resource imbalances to the acquirer will be targeted (Powell, 1997). For example, 
an acquirer with high liquidity, low leverage and growth prospects is more likely to target a 
firm with low liquidity, high leverage and growth prospects. Bruner (1988) finds that 
acquirers have greater financial slack ex ante. This supports the credence of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) that slack-rich acquirers with lower leverage, target slack-poor firms with 
higher financial leverage and growth opportunities than comparative non-target firms. 
Smith and Kim (1994) negate prior studies by providing evidence that highly leveraged 
acquirers target firms with free cash flows, which can be used to service the acquisition 
debt of the private equity acquirer. The private equity boom and bust cycles favour the 
latter argument, supported by greater private equity investment when the economic and 
financial environment is conducive to acquisition debt.  
Based on prior literature (Weir et al., 2008; Achleitner et al., 2010 and; Chapple et 
al., 2010) and the weaker bargaining position of private equity target firms compared to 
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tender/merger offer firms, the financial slack (leverage) of the target firm is predicted to be 
positively (negatively) correlated to the probability of a private equity bid.  Hypothesis 1a 
is as follows;  
 
H1a: Private equity bid targets have greater financial slack compared to 
tender/merger offer firms. 
3.2 Stock volatility 
Private equity funds are more likely to base their decision on privately acquired 
information compared to tender/merger offers, where the acquirer relies on publicly or 
semi-publicly available information. This distinction between the type of information 
supporting the decision to bid will have different implications on the level of public 
information in the market, stock price, and hence the volatility of returns. Hutson and 
Kearney (2001) consider the daily price and volume data for 112 of the largest takeover 
targets in Australia between 1985 and 1993. They provide evidence on the conditional price 
volatility of Australian target firms subsequent to the takeover announcement, and find a 
decline in price volatility attributable to convergence of trader opinions with respect to 
target stock value. The leverage of the target firm will influence the stock returns and thus 
pre bid/offer stock volatility. It is thereby predicted a negative relationship exists between 
stock volatility and the probability of a private equity bid. Hypothesis 1b is;  
 
H1b: Private equity bid targets have lower stock volatility compared to 
tender/merger offer firms. 
 
3.3 Free cash flow 
Free cash flow measures the excess cash flow over cash required to fund all positive 
net present value projects discounted at the appropriate cost of capital and inclusive of 
optimal investment in slack (Jensen, 1986 and Smith and Kim, 1994). Chapple et al. (2010) 
find free cash flows are positive and significantly related to the probability of a private 
equity bid relative to a corporate takeover for Australian target firms between 2001 and 
2007 inclusive. Earlier studies such as Lehn and Poulsen (1989) find undistributed cash 
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flows to be a significant determinant of a firm’s decision to go private, while Opler and 
Titman (1993) and Weir and Wright (2006) find stable free cash flows to be a significant 
investment criterion sought-after by private equity investment firms. Conversely, Weir et 
al. (2004) provide evidence that free cash flows are insignificant in relation to the 
probability of a UK firm going private.   
While prior literature provides conflicting evidence on free cash flows as a 
determinant of a merger, acquisition or private equity bid, the majority of studies favour the 
perspective that firms with greater free cash flows will be subject to a private equity bid 
compared to tender offers. Higher levels of free cash flows increase shareholder wealth 
where the private equity acquirer reduces the misalignment of resources and thus agency 
costs post-privatisation. It is hypothesised that a positive association exist between the free 
cash flows of the target firm and the probability of a private equity bid. Hypothesis H1c is;  
 
H1c: Private equity targets have greater free cash flows compared to tender/merger 
offer firms.  
3.4 Long-term growth prospects 
As private equity funds focus on long-term investment horizons, the long-term 
growth prospects of the target firm are a major indicator of the probability of a private 
equity bid compared to tender/merger offer. A target firm’s long-term growth prospects are 
commonly expressed as the market to book ratio, or Tobin’s q, indicative of the firm’s 
current and prospective performance. In addition, the long-term growth trends of the target 
firm are also evidenced through abnormal return on assets around the bid announcement. 
Morck et al. (1988 & 1989) and Bargeron et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence 
suggesting the share price of firms subject to a bid increases between the announcement of 
the bid and the privatisation date, through the premise that inefficient management will be 
replaced with efficient management. In addition, Palepu (1986) finds poorer stock market 
performance prior to a takeover bid increases the probability of bid occurrence. However, 
results of recent studies across different time frames and samples, conflict with Palepu 
(1986) (for example, Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). This is attributable to the market for 
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corporate control hypothesis that inefficient firms are easy targets for acquisition by more 
efficient firms (Tremblay and Tremblay, 1988 and Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984).  
Kumar (1984), Fowler and Schmidt (1988) and Yook (2004) provide evidence that 
managerial motives of growth and financial security increase the likelihood of mergers and 
acquisitions. Conversely, Chatterjee (2000), Weir and Laing (2003) and Siriopoulos et al. 
(2006) find that correcting managerial inefficiency is not an important motive for a 
takeover bid but that financially strong and profitable companies make better targets. 
Brown and da Silva Rosa (1997) and, Eddey and Taylor (1999) show that target firms 
underperform in the pre-bid period, subsequently however, privatisation increases firm 
value through the realignment of management and shareholders interests. In relation to 
private equity acquisitions, Wang (2010) finds that the monitoring provided by private 
equity provides a solution to agency costs (as measured by improvement in discretionary 
accruals quality). Overall, where management are under-utilising assets, privatisation can 
reallocate assets to managers who can better optimise the firm’s resources, thereby 
increasing the efficiency, firm, and thus shareholder value. It is hypothesised that;  
 
H1d: Private equity bid targets have lower long-term growth prospects compared to 
tender/merger offer firms.  
 
In addition to the firm-level characteristics of private equity targets discussed above, 
country-level factors such as legal origin, the cost of finance, and cyclical conditions likely 
impact the pattern of private equity activity. These characteristics are discussed next. 
 
3.5 Legal origin  
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Lerner and Schoar (2005) examine the significance 
of international legal differences on debt and equity market development. They find that 
legal origin, being common versus civil law, plays an integral role in financial sector 
development. Legal origin influences corporate transactions due to the perceived higher 
investor protections, stronger enforcement of shareholder rights, and the enforcement of 
managerial fiduciary duties present in common law countries. Common law countries are 
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believed to afford greater chose in action rights for investors, greater protection of minority 
shareholders, and increased consumer confidence over civil law countries.  
In a private equity context, Lerner and Schoar (2004) find that legal origin is 
significantly related to private equity contracts, indicated by larger transaction size in 
common law countries. Further, Djankov et al. (2003) find the time taken for dispute 
resolution arising from financial investment is strongly correlated with a country’s legal 
origin. Thus, private contractual arrangements only partially mitigate the effects of legal 
origin and further, legal origin is not the sole proxy indicative of legal regime influence on 
capital and equity markets investment. Given the greater investor protection afforded by 
common law jurisdictions, ceteris paribus, such countries should exhibit greater private 
equity activity. 
 
H2a: Private equity bid target firms in common law (civil law) countries have a 
higher (lower) probability of a private equity bid compared to a tender/merger offer, 
ceteris paribus.  
3.6 Cost of finance  
In 2007 private equity professionals attributed the precipitous increase in private 
equity dealings to be the result of “private equity firms … bask[ing] in an era of cheap 
money and low interest rates”.3 Echoing this notion is an Australian Senate inquiry into 
changing private equity investment levels, which investigated the acquisition debt profile of 
private equity investors. Negative correlation between the level of interest rates and private 
equity bids suggests that slack-poor acquirers take acquisition debt when interest rates are 
lower to acquire targets with financial slack that can subsequently be used to finance 
acquisition debt payments. It is therefore hypothesised that lower interest rates stimulate the 
economy providing capital markets with increased funds for private equity investment. 
 
H2b: Lower interest rates result in a higher probability of a private equity bid 
compared to tender/merger offer firms.   
                                                 
3 Wong, Grace 12 June 2007, Rising rates threaten the buyout boom, CCNMoney.com, viewed 18 January 
2010 <http://money.cnn.com/2007/06/12/markets/rates_private_equity/index.htm?section=money_markets>.  
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3.7 Cyclical conditions  
Capital markets are closely associated with economic conditions, driving the 
growing number and increasing value of private equity investments. When returns on 
equity are higher there is greater incentive for firms to replace equity with debt and 
undertake otherwise foregone investment opportunities. It is anticipated that market 
conditions will be mirrored in private equity investment trends. That is, changes in interest 
rates will be correlated to a country’s business cycles reflecting boom and bust cycles. This 
is suggested by the leveraged buyout boom resulting from the availability and low cost of 
debt exhibited in the economy.  
The Australian private equity market lags behind the US and Europe by several 
years, suggesting a correlation with country-specific business cycles and economic 
conditions, with some firms diversifying investments by vintage over the business cycle to 
reduce risk. Hence, the business cycle is predicted to influence private equity investment 
dependent on the stage of country’s boom and bust cycles. It is hypothesised that private 
equity bids exhibit greater occurrence during periods leading to a peak in economic 
activity, due to higher returns on equity and prospective investment opportunities. 
Hypothesis 2c is; 
 
H2c: Private equity target firms in countries experiencing a peak (trough) have a 
higher (lower) probability of a private equity bid comparative to a tender/merger offer. 
3.8 Equity home bias   
As private equity markets are often characterised by information asymmetry and 
agency problems at the outset, the geographical proximity of the target firm to the acquirer 
is expected to exhibit an equity home bias, defined as the target firm being within the same 
country as the acquirer’s headquarters. To avoid overexposure to country-specific risks, 
private equity funds have the opportunity to diversify in target firms globally. Previous 
research in mergers and acquisitions shows that foreign bidders are attracted to larger 
targets, for which there is some technological synergy for the bidder (Harris and 
Ravenscraft, 1991). In relation to foreign bidders of Australian listed targets, Bugeja (2011) 
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finds that foreign bidders acquire larger targets, with research intensity, for which they will 
pay a higher premium (and more frequently in the resources sector). However, these 
characteristics do not appear to be the preferences of private equity acquisitions.  
Conversely, prior literature (such as Lerner, 1995; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Cumming 
and Dai, 2007; and Tian, 2007)  focuses on the US venture capital market, and find such an 
investment bias to exist in the market across provinces in the US. This is consistent with the 
research of Coval and Moskowitz (1999; 2001) who find a geographically proximate 
preference within a 100-kilometre radius for investments in publicly traded firms. These 
findings are consistent with venture capital research by Lerner (1995) and Gompers and 
Lerner (1999) who provides evidence that venture capitalists exhibiting a closer proximity 
to the investee firm are more likely to serve on the firm’s board of directors post-
acquisition, subsequently wielding greater influence on the operating and investment 
decisions of the target firm.  Further, Fong, Gallagher and Lee (2008) follow the provincial 
approach of Coval and Moskowitz (2001) using Australian data, and find an overweighting 
by Sydney and Melbourne fund managers in favour of Melbourne stocks. 
This research considers whether private equity bids exhibit an equity home bias and 
further, whether the firm- and country-specific characteristics of the target firm change 
based on the geographical proximity of the target firm’s country to the acquirer-firm’s 
country. That is, whether foreign target firms exhibit different target characteristics to 
geographically proximate target firms between 2000 and 2009 inclusive. In light of the 
research results cited above, it is also expected that an intraprovincial bias exists within the 
US, where US based private equity acquirers in one state target US based firms in a 
different state. Based on prior literature, hypothesis 3 is;  
 
H3: Private equity bids exhibit home bias compared to tender/merger offer firms.         
4.  Empirical design     
A binary logistic model is used to test the relationship between firm-specific and 
country-specific characteristics on the probability of a private equity bid compared to 
tender/merger offers. The model by Chapple et al. (2010) is expanded to include target firm 
and country-specific characteristics reflective of country level differences of target firms 
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likely to influence the probability of a private equity bid. Additionally, firm-specific 
characteristics including annualised volatility and abnormal operating income are included 
as indicators of pre bid/offer performance.  
4.1 Firm-specific variable data   
The variable of interest, PRIV is a dichotomous variable set to “1” for firms subject 
to a private equity bid and “0” for a tender/merger offer. Each of the firm-specific 
characteristics of a private equity bid target firm including size, leverage and profitability 
are measured by size (lnTA), financial slack (D/E), free cash flows (FCF/TA), growth 
(M/B), stock volatility (VOL) and abnormal operating performance (ABNORM). A number 
of control variables for profitability (ROE), efficiency (TURN) and liquidity (CR) are used 
to account for the differences in the target firm’s internal characteristics.   
4.2 Average total assets and market value of equity   
Average total assets is calculated as the average between the bid-year total assets, 
and that of the prior financial year. The market value of equity is determined by common 
shares outstanding multiplied by the price per share.  
 
4.3 Stock volatility  
Stock volatility is measured as the volatility of each firm’s stock returns over the 60 
days prior to the bid/offer month, and is matched to the corresponding private equity bid or 
tender/merger offer by the bid/offer date and firm identifier. The volatility measure 
represents the daily logarithmic returns of stock (σd). Since this research considers stock 
volatility between private equity bid and tender/merger offer firms in conjunction with 
fiscal year data, the square root of time rule is used to annualise the daily volatility of stock 
returns. This is supported by the study firm’s demonstrating Brownian motion indicating 
that volatility increases with the square roof of the unit of time. The daily volatility of stock 
returns are annualised (σa) by multiplying the daily volatility measure by the square root of 
252 being the number of trading days in a given year where prices are subject to change. 
This yields an approximately correct annualised volatility measure as the daily volatility 
measure is calculated based upon simple returns.  
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4.4 Abnormal operating income   
Prior studies such as Kaplan (1989), Mikkelson and Shah (1994) and Holhausen and 
Larcker (1994) use operating income before depreciation to determine abnormal operating 
income for management buyouts, initial public offerings and reverse leverage buyouts 
respectively. The use of operating income before depreciation does not take into 
consideration the comparison being made with fiscal year-end asset valuation post-
depreciation. Hence, this study uses operating income after depreciation to calculate return 
on assets (ROA), as it represents the end of fiscal year operating income relative to the 
value of assets after accounting for asset usage over the fiscal year. Abnormal operating 
income is the firm’s operating income after depreciation divided by average total assets 
(ROA) minus the control operating income for each firm i where i represents the private 
equity bid or tender/merger offer firm.
4
  
The pooled study sample consisting of private equity bid and tender/merger offer 
target firms, is assigned a random number for each firm observation, and is matched on 
country, fiscal year and GICS code to the abnormal operating performance (ROA) control 
sample consisting of all firm observations from COMPUSTAT not previously matched to a 
private equity bid or tender/merger offer firm.
5
 The control sample firm observations 
matched to a study firm observation are grouped according to the random number assigned 
to each study firm observation and the mean ROA calculated for each group. The mean is 
taken as the control operating income (ROA) for each firm.   
4.5 Currency   
All fiscal year accounting data is converted into United States Dollars (USD) 
according to the exchange rate at the data date for the private equity bid and tender/merger 
offer study samples and the abnormal operating performance control sample. Daily 
currency exchange rates are from Worldscope and are matched to firm observations by the 
                                                 
4 Barber and Lyon (1996) results indicate no change in significance where end-of-period book value of assets 
is used relative to average total assets for the fiscal year.   
5 Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest test statistics are better specified where sample firms are matched to control 
firms of similar pre-event performance. However, this study is interested in the pre-event (bid/offer) 
performance of private equity target firms relative to tender/merger offer target firms therefore it is 
inappropriate to match on a performance criterion.  
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International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) currency code. Where the conversion 
date falls on a weekend the preceding Friday’s exchange rate is used. 
4.6 Country-specific variable data   
For the country-specific determinants, LAW is a dichotomous variable set to “1” for 
target firms in a common law country and “0” if the target firm is in a civil law country. 
Further, an interest rate variable (INTER) is included to indicate the relationship between 
interest rates and private equity bid or tender/merger offer investment at the bid/offer date. 
A dichotomous variable (BC) set to “1” for a peak in the respective country’s economic 
activity in the year of the initial bid /offer and “0” otherwise.6 A dichotomous variable 
(INTRA) is included to provide analysis of the intrajurisdictional bias associated with 
private equity bids. Control variables for taxation (TAX), corruption (CINDEX) and 
disclosure (DISC) are used to account for extraneous factors in country-specific 
characteristics that may influence LAW, INTER and/or INTRA (La Porta et al., 1997).   
 
4.7 Legal indices   
Additional country-specific variables including the rule of law, judicial system, risk 
of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, corruption index, disclosure index and the 
efficiency of the judicial system were obtained from La Porta et al. (1998). This research 
uses the judicial system, corruption and disclosure indices in the main regression. To check 
the robustness of the results the corruption index and disclosure index are substituted by the 
risk of contract repudiation and the efficiency of the judicial system respectively.  
 
4.8 Equity home bias variables   
Equity home bias variables are operationalized as both “intrajurisdictional” and 
“intraprovincial” (for United States firm observations) identifiers are created from the bid 
characteristic data on SDC Platinum in the pooled study sample for private equity bid and 
                                                 
6 Recession data complied from The Economic Cycle Research Institute with a recession defined as per the 
National Bureau of Economic Research as a significant decline in economic activity across the economy, 
lasting greater than a few months, visible in the real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, 
and wholesale-retail sale. 
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tender/merger offer firm observations. The intrajurisdictional identifier is set to “1” where 
the private equity bid or tender/merger offer is within the same nation and “0” otherwise. 
For the United States an identifier (ITRAUS) is set to “1” for intraprovincial bids/offers 
where the target state is the same as the acquirer state and “0” otherwise. Additionally, a 
variable (US) is set to “1” for the United States and “0” otherwise to test for robustness 
between the US and the remaining countries in the pooled sample.   
 
4.9 Interest rates  
Monthly United States Federal funds target interest rates are obtained from 
WorldScope for 2000-2009. Once allowing for interest rate parity it is expected interest 
rates remain the same across countries at a given point in time, therefore the US rate is used 
as a proxy for all countries in the sample.  
 
4.10 Taxation   
The taxation variable indicates whether the country has a classical or imputation 
taxation system. The corporate taxation rate is used to test for robustness as the corporate 
tax rate may change significantly across time whereas the taxation system may remain 
constant. The corporate tax rate for each sample year and country are obtained from 
KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2009. 7 The corporate taxation rate is the 
country wide corporate rate, however a number of countries, for example the United States, 
are a combination of Federal corporate income tax and State and Local Government taxes. 
Therefore, the United States corporate tax rate is the estimated average rate applied.  
 
4.11 The model   
Using the variables as described above, this study tests the association between 
these factors relating to the bid and bid preferences, and whether the bid was by a private 
                                                 
7
 KPMG, KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2009,  
<http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/KPMG-Corporate-Indirect-Tax-Rate-
Survey-2009.pdf>.  
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equity acquirer.   Table 1 specifies in full the regression variables. The logistic regression in 
this study is expressed as;  
 
PRIV = (0 + 1D/E + 2VOL + 3FCF/TA + 4M/B + 5lnTA + 6ABNORM + 7ROE 
+ 8TURN + 9CR + 10LAW + 11INTER + 12TAX + 13CINDEX + 14DISC + 15BC 
+ 16INTRA)          
   (Equation 1) 
 
where 1 through 9 pertain to the firm-specific characteristics of a private equity bid 
compared to a tender/merger offer and 10 through 16 country-specific characteristics of a 
private equity bid compared to a tender/merger offer. The following section presents data 
collection for each of the variables necessary for the aforementioned regression.   
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
5.  Data 
5.1 Sample selection   
The initial sample consists of firms subject to a private equity bid and a matched 
sample of tender/merger offer firms between 2000 and 2009, from the mergers and 
acquisitions database on Securities Data Corporation Platinum (SDC Platinum). The 
inclusion of private equity bid and tender/merger offer target firms allows for the 
identification of differences between the firm- and country-specific characteristics of firms 
subject to a private equity bid and the matched tender/merger offer firms.  
The initial private equity target firm sample consists of firms categorised under the 
acquisition technique ‘leveraged buyout’ flag producing an initial sample of 13,883 target 
firms, and is exclusive of government and government controlled entities. The initial 
comparison tender/merger offer firm sample comprises 2,986 target firms categorised under 
the acquisition technique ‘tender/merger’ flag for the initial fifteen private equity bid 
countries with business cycle (peak and trough) data available through the Economic Cycle 
Research Institute. The tender/merger offer firms indicate a tender offer to acquire control 
of the target firm subsequently followed by a merger agreement. Therefore, the initial 
sample includes firms from fifteen countries; Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, 
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India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, United Kingdom 
and the United States. The private equity sample is reduced to include only firms where the 
Acquirer’s Short Business Description is characterised as a private equity firm or fund 
reducing the sample to 3,436 target firm observations. The comparison tender/merger offer 
firm sample is reduced to include firms not classified as a private equity acquirer thus 
removing the possibility of duplication between the study and control target firm 
observations. This reduces the control group to 2,959 tender/merger offer target firm 
observations.  
Private equity bid and tender/merger offer firms without a CUSIP (Canada and 
United States) or SEDOL (Global) are excluded from the sample reducing the private 
equity bid and tender/merger offer firms to 2,056 and 2,696 target firm observations 
respectively. After omitting duplicate observations which may have resulted from the 
publicity of the first private equity bid or tender/merger offer, and observations with 
incomplete or insufficient data to meet the model requirements, the sample reduces to 227 
and 1,922 firms respectively. A unique identifier for each firm observation in the private 
equity bid, tender/merger offer and abnormal operating performance control samples is 
created to reflect CUSIP for the Canada/United States firms and SEDOL otherwise. 
Financial data is for the fiscal year immediately preceding the private equity bid or 
tender/merger offer year to reflect accounting information relevant to the decision to make 
a bid/offer on the target firm. The private equity bid target firm sample includes 146 firms, 
determined by the intersection of the private equity bid target firm sample and the 
availability of fiscal year data.  The comparison tender/merger offer firm sample is 1,195 
firms determined by the intersection of the tender/merger offer target firm sample and the 
availability of fiscal year data.  
The private equity bid target firms are matched without replacement to the 
tender/merger offer target firms by country, bid/offer year and two-digit GICS code, 
resulting in a final study sample of 115 private equity bids and 380 tender/merger offers. 
These firms span seven countries with free and well-developed equity markets as outlined 
by the FTSE Group’s developed market list, including; four common law countries: 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, and three civil law countries: 
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France, Germany and Sweden. The exclusion of emerging market countries prevents the 
distortion of the importance of country-specific determinants resultant from less 
economical integration with developed market countries. Country-specific variables are 
matched to the private equity bid and tender/merger offer target firm observations by 
country, year and month.  
 
6. Results  
6.1 Descriptive statistics   
Table 2 presents the frequency distribution by country, year and pre and post-match 
private equity bid and tender/merger offer.  The distribution highlights an increase in 
private equity bids over the period 2005-2007, with a decline in bids in 2008/2009. During 
the 2005-2007 period the proportion of private equity bids relative to tender/merger offers 
is higher. The distribution may be attributable to the favourable conditions for private 
equity investment including lowered interest rates in 2006/2007.
8
  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 presents the frequency distribution by industry pre and post-match. The 
consumer discretionary and information technology sectors exhibit the highest frequencies, 
with 38 and 32 post-match private equity bid target firm observations. The high number of 
information technology observations is unsurprising with technological advances during the 
2000-2009 period increasing consumer and investor confidence in this profitable, yet 
volatile, sector. The consumer discretionary sector represents favourable returns to 
investors, and thus increased marketable opportunities for investors within the sector from 
increased consumer demand resulting from increased consumer wealth.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 
                                                 
8 The favourable conditions for private equity investment were discussed during The Australian Senate 
Standing Committee on Economics inquiry into private equity investment in Australia. Commonwealth of 
Australia, Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Private Equity Investment in Australia, August 2007.     
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Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables, 
separately for the pooled sample, private equity bids and tender/merger offers. The pooled 
sample statistics indicate that volatility, free cash flows, market to book, firm size, 
abnormal operating income, current ratio, equity home investment, taxation system and 
disclosure index have means statistically different from zero. On average the standard 
deviation for firm-specific characteristics is higher for tender/merger offer target firms 
relative to private equity bid target firms. The direction of the mean of free cash flows for a 
private equity bid is positive (0.02070) whereas free cash flows for tender/merger offers is 
negative (-0.01427). This strengthens the argument that private equity bid target firms have 
greater free cash flows pre-bid than similar firms subject to tender/merger offers. The mean 
volatility suggests, on average, that tender/merger offer target firms experience greater 
volatility (0.68945) pre-offer than comparative private equity bid targets (0.45317). 
Abnormal operating income for private equity bid and tender/merger offer target firms have 
positive mean values; however the private equity bid target firms are higher (1.05481) than 
tender/merger offer target firms (0.47660). The country-specific characteristics are similar 
across private equity bid target firms and the control group. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5, Panels A and B, provide spearman correlation coefficients for the private 
equity, and merger control samples respectively, for all variables included in our regression 
model, including control variables. Notably, in Panel A, the annualised volatility of private 
equity bid targets is significantly negatively correlated with the business cycle variable BC 
(correlation coefficient of -0.41). While this is also the case for the control sample (Panel 
B), the magnitude of the correlation is far lower (correlation coefficient of -0.15), implying 
that the stock volatility observed for the private equity bid sample is more likely 
attributable to cyclical factors. In Panel B, the size variable LnTA, is significant and 
negatively correlated with annualised volatility and positively correlated with free cash 
flow. These associations are insignificant for the private equity bid firms (Panel A), 
suggesting the absence of a size effect explaining these variables. Additionally, there are a 
number of correlations exceeding 50% including return on equity and market to book 
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(tender/merger control sample only), business cycle and interests rates and, taxation system 
and corruption and disclosure indices. The correlation between interest rates and business 
cycle is expected as changes in interest rates impact on national and global capital markets. 
With respect to the private equity bid correlation matrix, return on equity and market to 
book are no longer correlated and the home bias and tax system variables (INTRA and 
TAX respectively) are correlated, suggesting tax advantages may contribute to a foreign 
target choice. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
6.2 Results discussion and analysis   
The results from the binary logistic regression, and fixed effects regressions are 
tabulated in Table 6. Fixed effects models are run on the premise country-specific variables 
are independent of firm-specific variables and thus fixed effects regressions control for 
country and year fixed effects reducing the threat of omitted variable bias. The results 
provide the maximum likelihood estimates from the primary regression adjusted for serial 
correlation in the disturbance terms country and year. The logistic regression is double 
clustered by firm and country. The Pseudo R
2
 for the main regression is 0.2297. After 
controlling for fixed effects by country and year the Pseudo R
2
 is 0.2999. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
6.21Firm-specific determinants   
The results provide evidence that annualised volatility, market to book, firm size 
and abnormal operating income are all significant determinants of a private bid relative to a 
tender/merger offer. Annualised volatility is negative (-1.5832) and significantly associated 
with the probability of a private equity bid at the 1% level (0.0003), and at the 5% level 
when accounting for fixed effects by year (0.0279) and country and year (0.0189). These 
results provide a strong argument for the market for corporate control hypothesis. Firms 
experiencing high volatility have a greater probability of a tender/merger offer to enhance 
shareholder value through efficient managerial practice relative to private equity target 
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firms. Subsequent to the announcement of a merger attempt the target firm’s stock price 
increases in value, however the greater the uncertainty surrounding the merger the greater 
the volatility. Further, the acquirer’s managers know more about private equity target firms 
pre-bid compared to tender/merger offer target firms where acquirers rely heavily on public 
information reflected in the stock price. Therefore, private equity bid target firms are more 
stable but experience managerial inefficiency, suggesting acquirers are more risk averse 
compared to tender/merger offer acquirers.  
Results also show a significantly negative (-0.1085) association at the 10% level 
(0.0505) between a private equity bid and the target firms market to book ratio relative to a 
tender/merger offer. The lower market to book ratio attributable to private equity bids may 
be due to different acquisition techniques. Mergers are more likely to be between 
businesses in a similar sector or line of business, therefore post-merger changes to the 
target firm will be nominal. Private equity acquirers target firms irrespective of poorer 
operating performance relative to the market, are not constrained by synergistic “line of 
business” targets and therefore are in a better position post-privatisation to make value 
enhancing operational changes. Firm size as measured by log of total assets is positively 
(0.2388) significant at the 1% level (0.0064), and after adjusting for fixed effects firm size 
is significant at the 5% level. These results indicate larger firms have a greater probability 
of a private equity bid relative to a tender/merger offer. One rationale is that private equity 
acquirers target large public companies they can take private, restructure and sell to another 
private equity investor or re-float. The payoff of these deals is significant for the private 
equity acquirer. Conversely, mergers are less concerned with target firm size and generally 
acquire firms with the view of monopolising or expanding their percentage hold over a 
particular industry or product line. In this respect, mergers exhibit a synergy whereby the 
acquirer and target firm cooperate advantageously to generate maximum profit after the 
merger.    
Abnormal operating income is positively (0.1926) significant at the 5% level 
(0.0269), however when controlling for fixed effects is insignificant when year is included. 
Private equity bids therefore have a greater abnormal operating income relative to the 
tender/merger offer firms. This indicates private equity acquirers prefer target firms that are 
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better performers compared to similar merger firms in the same country, year and industry. 
Private equity acquirers therefore target firms requiring minimal operating restructure in 
terms of assets relative to operating performance. 
Results also show that debt to equity (0.0546) and free cash flows (0.5094) are 
positively associated with, but insignificant determinants of, a private equity bid relative to 
a tender/merger offer. The control variables return on equity (-0.0937) and current ratio (-
0.1406) are negatively correlated to a private equity bid. The current ratio is negatively 
significant at the 10% level (0.0749) and 5% level after accounting for fixed effects by 
country and year (0.0344).  
Overall, the results support the hypotheses that private equity target firms exhibit 
lower stock volatility and long-term growth prospects, are larger and exhibit greater 
abnormal operating income relative to tender/merger offer target firms.  
6.22  Country-specific determinants   
The results indicate that legal origin is negatively (-1.0163) significant (0.0742) at 
the 10% level without the control variables included in the regression and insignificant 
otherwise. This rejects the hypothesis that investors, prefer common law over civil law 
countries.  
 
The remaining country-specific determinants are insignificant; however the results 
indicate association as hypothesised. There is a positive relationship between a peak in 
economic activity within a country and the probability of a private equity bid (0.0176). This 
is in conjunction with a negative correlation between interest rates and private equity 
investment (-0.0911). The relationship between business cycles and interest rates suggests 
business cycles are dependant on interest rate changes. The taxation system, corruption and 
disclosure indices are statistically insignificant.       
    
6.23 Equity home bias 
The results indicate the choice between a local or foreign target is a positive 
(1.0140) and significant (0.0060) determinant of private equity bid probability relative to a 
tender/merger offer. As hypothesised, private equity acquirers target firms within the same 
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country. Post-privatisation, it is intuitive that the acquirer prefers to be in close proximity to 
the target and in a position to restructure the board and managerial composition to achieve 
greater efficiency. There is also an incentive to target firms geographically proximate to 
reduce the cost base of restructuring post-privatisation where specialised professionals are 
able to commute between the acquirer and the target firm during the restructuring. Mergers 
are more diversified across countries, especially where the acquirer seeks synergy to break 
into an international product market or achieve market monopolisation. Adjusting for fixed 
effects does not affect the significance of intrajurisdictional investment for private equity 
bids (0.0082).  
 
 
6.3 Sensitivity analysis and robustness   
Nine regressions are run for robustness to test for differences in the maximum 
likelihood estimates due to variable proxy selection and country undue influence. Table 7 
presents the regression results for robustness and sensitivity to variable proxy choice. The 
results are consistent with the main regression, Table 6, with the exception of 
interjurisdictional investment (14). Regression 9 provides conflicting results with debt to 
equity and interest rate significant at the 10% level and taxation system at the 5% level. The 
results controlling for United States and non-United States target firms provide consistent 
results for the United States but insignificant results for non-United States target firms with 
the exception of firm size. This may be attributable to the small number of non-United 
States targets. Similar results are seen in regressions 9 and 10. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The results indicate that intrajurisdictional investors consider the taxation system 
and corruption as significant determinants of private equity bids over tender/merger offers. 
The provincial investment results for the United States provide scant support for the 
hypothesised results with the exception of annualised volatility for interprovincial 
investments. These results also provide evidence on the sensitivity of variable choice as 
proxies for the determinants of private equity bid target firm choice. Chapple et al. (2010) 
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use alternative proxies for each of the target firm characteristics with robustness tests 
indicating the results are not sensitive to the choice of proxy for each attribute.  
This study primarily used the country-specific characteristics of legal origin, 
corruption and disclosure indices. Following La Porta et al. (1998), the corruption index 
(CINDEX) and disclosure index (DISC) are substituted by the risk of contract repudiation 
and the efficiency of the judicial system indices respectively, as shown in Regression 12. 
Regression 12 finds repudiation of contracts to be a negatively significant determinant of a 
private equity bid at the 5% level. This indicates the higher the countries contract 
repudiation the lower the probability of a private equity bid relative to a tender/merger 
offer. Regression 13 replaces the dichotomous taxation system variable with the maximum 
corporate taxation rate by country and year for each firm observations bid/offer date. These 
results are consistent with the main regression. Regression 14 controls for the significant 
correlation between business cycles and interest rates by removing the business cycle 
variable from the regression. The business cycle variable is omitted as changes in interest 
rates influence country business cycles. The coefficients are similar to the main regression; 
however the interest rate is less insignificant (0.1801).   
Overall, the robustness and sensitivity results support the main regression and 
hypotheses that market to book and current ratio are significant at the 10% level, abnormal 
operating income is significant at the 5% level and volatility, firm size and 
intrajurisdictional investments are significant at the 1% level. 
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7. Conclusion 
The results reveal that relative to tender/merger offer target firms private equity bid 
target firms have lower stock volatility and long term growth prospects, but are larger in 
size, and exhibit intra-provincial bias. These results indicate private equity investors place 
greater reliance on firm-specific characteristics (internal determinants) over country-
specific characteristics (external determinants). This can be explained through 
diversification of country-specific risks by the acquirer. Strategically structured deals and 
low risk target firms mitigate country-specific determinants such as corruption and 
disclosure indices. In this respect, the current regulatory avenues governing private equity 
investment internationally are adequate enough to support changes in economic conditions 
as the results reveal that acquirers focus on firm-specific characteristics by controlling for 
adverse country-specific characteristics such as corruption and disclosure through 
investment contracts. Equity home bias is expected as private equity investors prefer a 
closer proximity to the target firm for ease of restructuring and corporate control. The 
results are thereby indicative of greater reliance on firm-specific characteristics over 
country-specific characteristics.  
 Specifically, this study proposed three sets of hypotheses regarding global private 
equity deals compared to tender offer/merger deals. First, regarding firm characteristics, we 
hypothesised that private equity bid targets have greater financial slack, lower stock 
volatility, greater free cash flows and lower long term growth (measured by market to 
book).  The results support these predictions except for the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Second, regarding private equity bid targets and country characteristics, we hypothesised 
that target firms in common law countries have a higher probability of a private equity bid, 
and that lower interest rates and a peak business cycle would result in a higher probability 
of a private equity bid. The results do not support these hypotheses. Finally, we 
hypothesised and found evidence that private equity bids exhibit home bias compared to 
tender/merger offer firms,  
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The hypothesised direction for business cycles, interest rates and jurisdiction are 
reflected in the composition of the pooled sample. A greater number of private equity bids 
and tender/merger offers occur in economies experiencing a peak relative to a trough. The 
results support earlier studies that market to book, firm size and abnormal operating income 
are significant determinants of private equity bid likelihood. This study provides a unique 
perspective on private equity bid probability relative to a tender/merger offer. In contrast to 
prior research, this study draws direct inferences between the two acquisition techniques 
rather than using a control sample of pooled acquisition techniques. Further, this study 
provides evidence that stock volatility is greater for tender/merger offer target firms relative 
to private equity bid target firm observations 60 days prior to the bid/offer.  
 
Private equity investment has grown to be a valuable asset class in capital markets 
in the past decade. This paper provides empirical evidence on the internal and external 
determinants of private equity bids relative to a tender/merger offer. The results provide 
evidence that firm-specific characteristics are relied upon to a greater extent than country-
specific characteristics in the seven developed countries included in this research for the 
study years 2000-2009 inclusive. It evidences preconceived notions about private equity 
investment funds targeting underperforming firms are inaccurate with stock volatility 
greater for tender/merger offer firms relative to private equity target firms that exhibit 
higher abnormal operating income and lower stock volatility pre-bid.  
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Table 1: Definition of Regression Variables   
   
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
PRIV   = a dichotomous variable equal to one for private equity bids and 
zero otherwise 
   INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: FIRM SPECIFIC 
D/E (-) = financial slack (debt to equity ratio)   
VOL (-) = stock volatility    
FCF/TA  (+) = cash flows of the target firm   
M/B (-) = performance measure (market to book ratio)   
lnTA (+) = firm size (log of total assets)  
ABNORM (+) = pre-bid abnormal operating performance  
ROE  = control variable for profitability (return on equity)   
TURN   = control variable for efficiency (asset turnover ratio) 
CR  = control variable for liquidity (current ratio)  
   
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: COUNTRY SPECIFIC 
LAW (+) = a dichotomous variable equal to one for common law countries 
and zero otherwise 
INTER (-) = interest rate variable   
TAX  = control variable for taxation system  
CINDEX   = control variable for corruption index   
DISC   = control variable for disclosure index    
BC (+) = a dichotomous variable set equal to one for a peak in economic 
activity and zero otherwise 
INTRA (+) = a dichotomous variable to measure equity home bias, set equal to 
one for an intrajurisdictional investment and zero otherwise 
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Table 2: Frequency Distribution by Country and Year (Pre and Post Match by Country, 
Year and Industry)   
 
 
  Year  
 Country                 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
 Australia             
P
re
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid        2 1 2 1 6 
Tender/Merger Offer  16 9 9 17 11 18 30 29 10 21 170 
Total  16 9 9 17 11 18 32 30 12 22 176 
P
o
st
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid        2 1 2  5 
Tender/Merger Offer        6 5 1  12 
Total        8 6 3  17 
 Canada            
P
re
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid     1 2  2 1  6 
Tender/Merger Offer  7 4 1 1 5 1 2 4  1 26 
Total  7 4 1 1 6 3 2 6 1 1 32 
P
o
st
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid         1   1 
Tender/Merger Offer         3   3 
Total         4   4 
 France            
P
re
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid  1    1 1 2 3 1  9 
Tender/Merger Offer  7 8 4 3 2 6 1 2 8  41 
Total  8 8 4 3 3 7 3 5 9  50 
P
o
st
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid  1    1   2 1  5 
Tender/Merger Offer  2    1   1 1  5 
Total  3    2   3 2  10 
 Germany            
P
re
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid    1  1  1 2 1  6 
Tender/Merger Offer  1 1 4 5 2 2 3 2 3 5 28 
Total  1 1 5 5 3 2 4 4 4 5 34 
P
o
st
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid        1    1 
Tender/Merger Offer        1    1 
Total        2    2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 Country                 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
38 
 Sweden             
P
re
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid        1  1  2 
Tender/Merger Offer  7 4 3 4 4 2 8 6 5 2 45 
Total  7 4 3 4 4 2 9 6 6 2 47 
P
o
st
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid        1    1 
Tender/Merger Offer        3    3 
Total        4    4 
 United Kingdom             
P
re
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid      1 2 2 5 3 1 14 
Tender/Merger Offer  40 31 35 37 34 34 30 54 42 16 353 
Total  40 31 35 37 35 36 32 59 45 17 367 
P
o
st
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid      1 2 2 4 3 1 13 
Tender/Merger Offer      9 2 7 35 31 3 87 
Total      10 4 9 39 34 4 100 
 United States            
P
re
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid  5 1 1  6 12 20 26 13 13 97 
Tender/Merger Offer  123 62 43 26 18 24 21 41 44 29 431 
Total  128 63 44 26 24 36 41 67 57 42 528 
P
o
st
-
M
at
ch
  Private Equity Bid  5 1 1  6 12 20 25 12 7 89 
Tender/Merger Offer  85 27 14  9 15 20 39 37 23 269 
Total  90 28 15  15 27 40 64 49 30 358 
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Table 3: Frequency Distribution by Industry (Pre and Post Match by Country, Year 
and Industry)  
 
 
  Pre-Match  Post-Match 
GICS Sector  
GICS 
Code  
Private 
Equity  
Tender/Merger 
Offer  
Private 
Equity  
Tender/Merger 
Offer  
      
Energy  10 2 56 1 1 
Materials  15 8 129 6 11 
Industrials  20 19 216 17 66 
Consumer Discretionary  25 51 252 38 88 
Consumer Staples  30 9 77 7 16 
Health Care  35 15 146 13 68 
Financials  40 2 22 0 0 
Information Technology  45 36 267 32 129 
Telecommunications  50 2 15 1 1 
Utilities  55 2 15 0 0 
Total   146 1195 115 380 
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Table 4: Private Equity Bids and Tender/Merger Offers Descriptive Statistics  
 
Descriptive statistics for all firms subject to a private equity bid or tender/merger offer on SDC Platinum between 2000 and 2009 with financials data available on COMPUSTAT. 
The dichotomous variables (LAW, INTRA, BC and TAX) are included for completeness. The mean represents the proportion of target firms in common law countries, 
intrajurisdictional bids/offers, bids/offers in a peak economic state and target firms in countries with a classical taxation system respectively.     
  Private Equity Bids and Tender/Merger Offers Private Equity Bids Tender/Merger Offers 
Variable Description N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum p-value N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
D/E   Debt to Equity  
495 0.59528 0.12460 1.51401 0 19.01561 0.2784 115 0.72949 0.32577 1.37584 0 11.72904 380 0.55467 0.07974 1.55282 0 19.01561 
VOL   Annualised                          
Volatility  
495 0.63455 0.48753 0.49457 0.09986 3.61562 <.0001 115 0.45317 0.35178 0.37511 0.14185 3.19133 380 0.68945 0.51917 0.51331 0.09986 3.61562 
FCF/TA   Free Cash Flows 495 -0.00614 0.02346 0.15262 -0.81978 0.39779 0.0043 115 0.02070 0.02984 0.09344 -0.43278 0.21493 380 -0.01427 0.02088 0.16567 -0.81978 0.39779 
M/B   Market to Book  495 3.09399 2.03117 5.54931 0.03588 101.74767 0.0125 115 2.38617 1.95664 1.95660 0.03588 15.38878 380 3.30819 2.04110 6.22811 0.03650 101.74767 
lnTA   Firm Size  495 5.42579 5.23399 1.49255 1.19655 10.44198 <.0001 115 5.97690 5.86977 1.39443 3.31689 9.70996 380 5.25901 5.06790 1.48281 1.19655 10.44198 
ABNORM   Abnormal 
Operating Income  
495 0.61093 0.25989 1.51857 -1.22337 18.46602 0.0151 115 1.05481 0.40619 2.44906 -0.12510 18.46602 380 0.47660 0.23601 1.06008 -1.22337 13.52120 
ROE   Return on Equity  495 -0.15144 0.06822 1.24990 -22.13121 2.01043 0.1056 115 -0.02595 0.07911 0.77973 -6.38995 1.14612 380 -0.18942 0.05902 1.35911 -22.13121 2.01043 
TURN   Asset Turnover  495 1.19465 1.01221 0.82297 0 7.08537 0.3949 115 1.25192 1.07369 0.76102 0.09017 4.18822 380 1.17732 1.00130 0.84100 0 7.08537 
CR   Current Ratio  495 2.55136 1.82201 2.69519 0.16992 40.65775 0.0034 115 2.08697 1.58148 1.48388 0.31582 8.03637 380 2.69190 1.88112 2.95307 0.16992 40.65775 
LAW   Jurisdiction  495 0.96768 1.00000 0.17704 0 1.00000 0.1191 115 0.93913 1.00000 0.24014 0 1.00000 380 0.97632 1.00000 0.15226 0 1.00000 
INTRA   Intrajurisdictional 495 0.80404 1.00000 0.39734 0 1.00000 0.0010 115 0.89565 1.00000 0.30705 0 1.00000 380 0.77632 1.00000 0.41726 0 1.00000 
BC   Business Cycle  495 0.74949 1.00000 0.43374 0 1.00000 0.3506 115 0.78261 1.00000 0.41428 0 1.00000 380 0.73947 1.00000 0.43950 0 1.00000 
INTER   Interest Rate  495 3.98485 4.75000 1.90295 0.25000 6.50000 0.6149 115 3.90652 4.50000 1.71310 0.25000 6.50000 380 4.00855 4.75000 1.95828 0.25000 6.50000 
TAX   Taxation System  495 0.74545 1.00000 0.43605 0 1.00000 0.0434 115 0.81739 1.00000 0.38804 0 1.00000 380 0.72368 1.00000 0.44776 0 1.00000 
CINDEX   Corruption Index  495 8.75301 8.63000 0.25358 8.52000 10.00000 0.1483 115 8.72304 8.63000 0.24175 8.52000 10.00000 380 8.76208 8.63000 0.25667 8.52000 10.00000 
DISC   Disclosure Index  495 72.59596 71.00000 3.09276 62.00000 83.00000 0.0083 115 71.93043 71.00000 2.76482 62.00000 83.00000 380 72.79737 71.00000 3.16119 62.00000 83.00000 
There are two methods for computing the systematic differences in the descriptive statistics over the study and control groups (standard error in the difference of the means (t-test Pr > 
|t|)). The method used is dependant on the variance of the study and control groups. Where the equality of variances significance probability is less than =0.05 (Pr > F) it provides 
evidence that the variances of the private equity bid and tender/merger offer groups are different and the Satterthwaite method is used to test the difference between the means of the 
private equity bid and tender/merger offer groups. Where the equality of variances significance probability is greater than =0.05 the pooled method is used. Where the probability is 
less than =0.05 the difference in means is statistically significant from zero. 
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Table 5: Tables of Cross Correlations 
 
Panel A: Private Equity Bids Correlation Coefficients 
Spearman correlation coefficients for all firms subject to a private equity bid on SDC Platinum between 2000 and 2009 with financial data available on 
COMPUSTAT (N=115).  
 
 D/E VOL FCF/TA M/B lnTA ABNORM ROE TURN CR LAW INTRA BC INTER TAX CINDEX DISC 
D/E 
Debt to Equity 
1.00000 
 
               
VOL 
Annualised Volatility 
0.11611 
0.2165 
1.00000 
 
              
FCF/TA 
Free Cash Flows 
-0.11444 
0.2233 
-0.11236 
0.2319 
1.00000 
 
             
M/B 
Market to Book 
0.12807 
0.1725 
-0.07778 
0.4087 
0.29444 
0.0014 
1.00000 
 
            
lnTA 
Firm Size 
0.22053 
0.0179 
-0.10792 
0.2509 
-0.01693 
0.8575 
0.08676 
0.3566 
1.00000 
 
           
ABNORM 
Abnormal Operating 
Income 
-0.00530 
0.9552 
-0.07905 
0.4010 
-0.00043 
0.9963 
-0.00432 
0.9635 
-0.04865 
0.6056 
1.00000 
 
          
ROE 
Return on Equity 
-0.28358 
0.0021 
-0.24953 
0.0072 
0.11648 
0.2151 
0.21051 
0.0239 
-0.01527 
0.8713 
0.04649 
0.6218 
1.00000 
 
         
TURN 
Asset Turnover 
-0.11335 
0.2278 
-0.05838 
0.5354 
0.07257 
0.4409 
0.00260 
0.9780 
-0.06437 
0.4943 
-0.06553 
0.4865 
0.13803 
0.1413 
1.00000 
 
        
CR 
Current Ratio 
-0.18060 
0.0534 
-0.11416 
0.2244 
-0.09989 
0.2881 
-0.10682 
0.2558 
-0.24538 
0.0082 
0.23097 
0.0130 
0.11089 
0.2381 
0.00650 
0.9451 
1.00000 
 
       
LAW 
Jurisdiction 
0.03085 
0.7434 
0.10559 
0.2614 
-0.00274 
0.9768 
0.06103 
0.5170 
-0.05053 
0.5918 
0.10893 
0.2465 
-0.05236 
0.5784 
-0.03907 
0.6784 
0.13932 
0.1375 
1.00000 
 
      
INTRA 
Intrajurisdictional 
0.04928 
0.6010 
-0.06807 
0.4698 
0.07076 
0.4523 
0.10494 
0.2644 
-0.07297 
0.4384 
0.12591 
0.1800 
-0.00213 
0.9820 
0.01001 
0.9154 
0.08289 
0.3785 
0.27000 
0.0035 
1.00000 
 
     
BC 
Business Cycle 
0.15635 
0.0952 
-0.41150 
<.0001 
-0.14659 
0.1180 
0.01136 
0.9041 
0.22144 
0.0174 
0.06911 
0.4630 
0.16376 
0.0803 
0.19037 
0.0416 
-0.01089 
0.9080 
-0.04600 
0.6254 
-0.11094 
0.2379 
1.00000 
 
    
INTER 
Interest Rate 
0.13550 
0.1488 
-0.33643 
0.0002 
-0.02039 
0.8287 
0.13868 
0.1394 
0.15794 
0.0918 
0.00311 
0.9737 
0.24282 
0.0089 
0.12438 
0.1854 
-0.00951 
0.9197 
-0.07792 
0.4078 
-0.05206 
0.5806 
0.60148 
<.0001 
1.00000 
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 D/E VOL FCF/TA M/B lnTA ABNORM ROE TURN CR LAW INTRA BC INTER TAX CINDEX DISC 
TAX 
Taxation System  
0.11414 
0.2245 
-0.04608 
0.6248 
0.31005 
0.0007 
-0.03884 
0.6803 
-0.10699 
0.2551 
0.19190 
0.0399 
-0.02659 
0.7778 
0.15420 
0.0999 
0.14619 
0.1190 
0.06794 
0.4706 
0.50128 
<.0001 
-0.03084 
0.7435 
0.04667 
0.6204 
1.00000 
 
  
CINDEX 
Corruption Index 
-0.07560 
0.4220 
-0.04286 
0.6492 
-0.16753 
0.0735 
-0.01694 
0.8574 
0.15648 
0.0949 
-0.15564 
0.0967 
-0.00262 
0.9778 
-0.09287 
0.3236 
-0.08898 
0.3443 
-0.47124 
<.0001 
-0.41638 
<.0001 
0.10389 
0.2692 
0.05809 
0.5374 
-0.54386 
<.0001 
1.00000 
 
 
DISC 
Disclosure Index 
-0.11217 
0.2327 
0.05269 
0.5760 
-0.26313 
0.0045 
0.05964 
0.5266 
0.09598 
0.3075 
-0.13614 
0.1469 
0.01684 
0.8582 
-0.14210 
0.1298 
-0.05933 
0.5288 
0.17853 
0.0563 
-0.22562 
0.0153 
0.02497 
0.7911 
-0.03981 
0.6727 
-0.73963 
<.0001 
0.58092 
<.0001 
1.00000 
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Panel B: Tender/Merger Offers Correlation Coefficients 
Spearman correlation coefficients for all firms subject to a tender/merger offer on SDC Platinum between 2000 and 2009 with financials data available on 
COMPUSTAT (N=380).  
 
 D/E VOL FCF/TA M/B lnTA ABNORM ROE TURN CR LAW INTRA BC INTER TAX CINDEX DISC 
D/E 
Debt to Equity 
1.00000 
 
               
VOL 
Annualised Volatility 
0.09607 
0.0614 
1.00000 
 
              
FCF/TA 
Free Cash Flows 
-0.00273 
0.9577 
-0.41608 
<.0001 
1.00000 
 
             
M/B 
Market to Book 
0.41343 
<.0001 
-0.05655 
0.2715 
0.08795 
0.0869 
1.00000 
 
            
lnTA 
Firm Size 
0.10026 
0.0508 
-0.21436 
<.0001 
0.14316 
0.0052 
-0.06006 
0.2428 
1.00000 
 
           
ABNORM 
Abnormal Operating 
Income 
-0.01060 
0.8368 
-0.08820 
0.0860 
0.08813 
0.0862 
-0.02757 
0.5922 
0.01487 
0.7727 
1.00000 
 
          
ROE 
Return on Equity 
-0.51208 
<.0001 
-0.21945 
<.0001 
0.29444 
<.0001 
-0.67832 
<.0001 
0.10356 
0.0436 
0.04700 
0.3609 
1.00000 
 
         
TURN 
Asset Turnover 
-0.05233 
0.3089 
-0.10102 
0.0491 
0.30426 
<.0001 
0.02008 
0.6964 
-0.15833 
0.0020 
-0.05818 
0.2579 
0.12246 
0.0169 
1.00000 
 
        
CR 
Current Ratio 
-0.14111 
0.0059 
0.02812 
0.5847 
-0.16045 
0.0017 
-0.07113 
0.1665 
-0.07068 
0.1692 
0.06858 
0.1822 
0.03941 
0.4436 
-0.26467 
<.0001 
1.00000 
 
       
LAW 
Jurisdiction 
0.01833 
0.7217 
0.03290 
0.5226 
-0.02079 
0.6863 
0.01836 
0.7212 
-0.05603 
0.2759 
0.06310 
0.2198 
-0.03855 
0.4537 
-0.08977 
0.0805 
0.07278 
0.1568 
1.00000 
 
      
INTRA 
Intrajurisdictional 
0.06603 
0.1990 
0.05262 
0.3063 
-0.02425 
0.6374 
0.02786 
0.5883 
-0.06122 
0.2339 
-0.00931 
0.8565 
-0.05090 
0.3224 
-0.02597 
0.6138 
-0.02584 
0.6156 
0.04098 
0.4257 
1.00000 
 
     
BC 
Business Cycle 
0.07409 
0.1494 
-0.15346 
0.0027 
0.16692 
0.0011 
-0.05191 
0.3128 
0.08185 
0.1111 
0.01333 
0.7956 
0.13268 
0.0096 
0.20078 
<.0001 
-0.18973 
0.0002 
-0.05302 
0.3026 
-0.10280 
0.0452 
1.00000 
 
    
INTER 
Interest Rate 
0.02960 
0.5651 
-0.04816 
0.3491 
0.09605 
0.0614 
-0.01981 
0.7003 
0.08644 
0.0924 
-0.15829 
0.0020 
0.08851 
0.0849 
0.22333 
<.0001 
-0.16315 
0.0014 
-0.05241 
0.3082 
-0.13489 
0.0085 
0.61037 
<.0001 
1.00000 
 
   
TAX 
Taxation System  
-0.01803 
0.7260 
0.16362 
0.0014 
-0.15913 
0.0019 
-0.18150 
0.0004 
0.13682 
0.0076 
0.21052 
<.0001 
0.02477 
0.6303 
-0.06477 
0.2077 
0.21405 
<.0001 
0.01986 
0.6996 
-0.03512 
0.4949 
-0.08521 
0.0972 
0.10125 
0.0486 
1.00000 
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 D/E VOL FCF/TA M/B lnTA ABNORM ROE TURN CR LAW INTRA BC INTER TAX CINDEX DISC 
CINDEX 
Corruption Index 
-0.01876 
0.7155 
-0.20714 
<.0001 
0.13214 
0.0099 
0.13574 
0.0081 
0.01147 
0.8236 
-0.17142 
0.0008 
-0.01074 
0.8347 
0.05600 
0.2762 
-0.15076 
0.0032 
-0.35926 
<.0001 
-0.02521 
0.6242 
0.07873 
0.1255 
-0.07369 
0.1517 
-0.71335 
<.0001 
1.00000 
 
 
DISC 
Disclosure Index 
0.01109 
0.8294 
-0.19693 
0.0001 
0.16009 
0.0017 
0.17785 
0.0005 
-0.11652 
0.0231 
-0.19645 
0.0001 
-0.03059 
0.5522 
0.06020 
0.2417 
-0.20143 
<.0001 
-0.00452 
0.9301 
0.03756 
0.4654 
0.06825 
0.1843 
-0.11363 
0.0268 
-0.87849 
<.0001 
0.79831 
<.0001 
1.00000 
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Table 6: Logistic Regression Results  
This table presents the summary binary logistic regression results from the following model:  
 
PRIV = f(o + 1D/E + 2VOL + 3FCF/TA + 4M/B + 5lnTA + 6ABNORM + 7ROE + 8TURN + 9CR+ 10LAW  
 + 11INTER + 12TAX + 13CINDEX + 14DISC + 15BC + 16INTRA)  
 
where PRIV is a dichotomous variable set equal to PRIV=1 for private equity bids and PRIV=0 for tender/merger offer firms observations from 
SDC Platinum. D/E is long-term debt (total) divided by common/ordinary equity (total), VOL is stock volatility 60 days prior to the bid/offer date, 
FCF/TA is (operating activities net cash flow minus capital expenditures) divided by total assets, M/B is market value of equity divided by 
common/ordinary equity (total), lnTA is log of total assets, ABNORM is (operating income (after depreciation) divided by average total assets) 
minus control operating income, ROE is net income divided by common/ordinary equity (total), TURN is sales/turnover(net) divided by average 
total assets, CR is current assets (total) divided by current liabilities. LAW is a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 for common law countries or  0 
for civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1998), INTER is the interest rate variable (Worldscope), TAX is a control variable for taxation system 
(KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2009), CINDEX is the corruption index (La Porta et al., 1998), DISC is the disclosure index 
(La Porta et al., 1998), BC is a dichotomous variable set equal to one for a peak in economic activity and zero otherwise  (Economic Cycle 
Research Institute) and INTRA is a dichotomous variable set equal to one for an intrajurisdictional investment and zero otherwise (SDC 
Platinum). All financials data is for the fiscal year preceding the private equity bid or tender/merger offer from COMPUSTAT. The comparative 
analysis between the probability of a private equity bid relative to a tender/merger offer given firm-specific and country-specific characteristics is 
calculated on a pooled sample of n=495 where n=115 private equity bids (PRIV = 1) and n=380 tender/merger offers (PRIV = 0) matched by 
country, year and 2-digit GICS code. The maximum likelihood estimates of a private equity bid compared to a tender/merger offer with (2) and 
without (1) control variables. Fixed effects regressions are included to control for; (3) year, (4) country, (5) country and year. 
P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates in italics, and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation in the residuals.  
 
Variable   (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept   -1.4414 
0.1057 
12.4259* 
0.0944 
13.1143* 
0.0648 
-1.0524 
0.1739 
-1.7457** 
0.0363 
D/E 
Debt to Equity 
 0.1010 
0.2313 
0.0546 
0.5351 
0.1061 
0.2959 
0.0608 
0.4769 
0.1344 
0.2101 
VOL 
Annualised Volatility 
 -1.3634***  
0.0008 
-1.5832*** 
0.0003 
-0.9718** 
0.0279 
-1.5776*** 
0.0004 
-1.0412** 
0.0189 
FCF/TA 
Free Cash Flows 
 0.8731 
0.4174 
0.5094 
0.6638 
0.3704 
0.7630 
0.6450 
0.5823 
0.4063 
0.7360 
M/B 
Market to Book 
 -0.1205** 
0.0268 
-0.1085* 
0.0505 
-0.1426** 
0.0213 
-0.1103** 
0.0480 
-0.1480** 
0.0169 
lnTA 
Firm Size 
 
0.2464*** 
0.0025 
0.2388*** 
0.0064 
0.2327** 
0.0116 
0.2049** 
0.0168 
0.1947** 
0.0329 
ABNORM 
Abnormal Operating Income 
 0.1976** 
0.0167 
0.1926** 
0.0269 
0.0908 
0.2586 
0.2180** 
0.0195 
0.0899 
0.2677 
ROE 
Return on Equity 
  -0.0937 
0.6520 
0.0328 
0.8858 
-0.1498 
0.4623 
0.0275 
0.9051 
TURN 
Asset Turnover 
  0.1485 
0.3253 
0.2015 
0.2306 
0.0994 
0.4925 
0.2092 
0.1997 
CR 
Current Ratio 
  -0.1406* 
0.0749 
-0.1536* 
0.0664 
-0.1357* 
0.0821 
-0.1176** 
0.0344 
LAW 
Legal Origin 
 -1.0163* 
0.0742 
-1.2417 
0.1813 
-0.9285 
0.2943 
  
INTRA 
Intrajurisdictional 
 1.0598*** 
0.0033 
1.0140*** 
0.0060 
1.0145*** 
0.0082 
  
BC 
Business Cycle 
 0.0016 
0.9964 
0.0176 
0.9608 
0.0911 
0.9170 
  
INTER 
Interest Rate 
 -0.0486 
0.5288 
-0.0911 
0.2589 
0.2515 
0.3440 
  
TAX 
Taxation System  
  -0.2733 
0.5997 
-0.2762 
0.5991 
  
CINDEX 
Corruption Index 
  -0.8516 
0.4518 
-0.6906 
0.4926 
  
DISC 
Disclosure Index 
  -0.0760 
0.4585 
-0.1322 
0.1833 
  
 Pseudo R
2
   0.1979 0.2297 0.3172 0.2032 0.2999 
N  495 495 495 495 495 
 
***, **, and * denote a statistically significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Robustness Results 
This table presents the summary binary logistic regression robustness results from the following model:  
 
PRIV = f(o + 1D/E + 2VOL + 3FCF/TA + 4M/B + 5lnTA + 6ABNORM + 7ROE + 8TURN + 9CR+ 10LAW+ 11INTER  
+ 12TAX + 13CINDEX + 14DISC + 15BC + 16INTRA)  
 
where PRIV is a dichotomous variable set equal to PRIV=1 for private equity bids and PRIV=0 for tender/merger offer firms observations from SDC 
Platinum. D/E is long-term debt (total) divided by common/ordinary equity (total), VOL is stock volatility 60 days prior to the bid/offer date, FCF/TA is 
(operating activities net cash flow minus capital expenditures) divided by total assets, M/B is market value of equity divided by common/ordinary equity 
(total), lnTA is log of total assets, ABNORM is (operating income (after depreciation) divided by average total assets) minus control operating income, 
ROE is net income divided by common/ordinary equity (total), TURN is sales/turnover(net) divided by average total assets, CR is current assets (total) 
divided by current liabilities. LAW is a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 for common law countries or 0 for civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1998), 
INTER is the interest rate variable (Worldscope), TAX is a control variable for taxation system (KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2009), 
CINDEX is the corruption index (La Porta et al., 1998), DISC is the disclosure index (La Porta et al., 1998), BC is a dichotomous variable set equal to one 
for a peak in economic activity and zero otherwise  (Economic Cycle Research Institute) and INTRA is a dichotomous variable set equal to one for an 
intrajurisdictional investment and zero otherwise (SDC Platinum). All financials data is for the fiscal year preceding the private equity bid or tender/merger 
offer from COMPUSTAT. The maximum likelihood estimates of a private equity bid compared to a tender/merger offer; (6) US target firms, (7) non-US 
target firms, (8) intrajurisdictional investment, (9) interjurisdictional investment, (10) within US intraprovincial investment (INTRA = intraprovincial), (11) 
within US interprovincial investment (INTRA = interprovincial), (12) with repudiation of contracts as CINDEX and efficiency of judicial system as DISC, 
(13) with maximum corporate taxation rate as TAX and, (14) without business cycle variable.   
P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates in italics, and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation in the residuals.  
 
Variable   (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10) (11)  (12) (13)  (14) 
Intercept   -3.7255** 
0.0156 
18.8725** 
0.0373 
19.9949** 
0.0452 
33.7133 
0.1774 
-0.1398 
0.9677 
-0.0239 
0.9831 
16.2473** 
0.0226 
16.2360 
0.1332 
12.4132* 
0.0945 
D/E 
Debt to Equity 
 0.0537 
0.5769 
-0.4149 
0.4592 
0.0271 
0.7586 
1.5487* 
0.0866 
-0.2107 
0.4938 
0.3216** 
0.0297 
0.0512 
0.5615 
0.0548 
0.5339 
0.0553 
0.5257 
VOL 
Annualised Volatility 
 -2.0897*** 
0.0005 
-0.3158 
0.6315 
-1.9381*** 
0.0003 
-0.6161 
0.6019 
-2.2486 
0.2687 
-2.2792*** 
0.0009 
-1.6064*** 
0.0003 
-1.5701*** 
0.0004 
-1.5859*** 
0.0003 
FCF/TA 
Free Cash Flows 
 2.4474 
0.1163 
-4.0218 
0.1288 
0.3136 
0.8063 
-0.7853 
0.8348 
5.0284 
0.3716 
2.7128 
0.1299 
0.4410 
0.7060 
0.5165 
0.6596 
0.5064 
0.6652 
M/B 
Market to Book 
 -0.0710 
0.3061 
-0.1075 
0.3644 
-0.0675 
0.2260 
-0.2477 
0.4098 
0.1005 
0.6112 
-0.1368* 
0.0926 
-0.0996* 
0.0700 
-0.1116** 
0.0466 
-0.1086* 
0.0500 
lnTA 
Firm Size 
 
0.1326 
0.2388 
0.5429*** 
0.0035 
0.2615*** 
0.0096 
0.3847 
0.1949 
-0.1891 
0.6055 
0.1709 
0.1894 
0.2340*** 
0.0075 
0.2417*** 
0.0060 
0.2390*** 
0.0063 
ABNORM 
Abnormal Operating Income 
 0.2310** 
0.0156 
0.4357 
0.8447 
0.2820** 
0.0160 
-0.0910 
0.8783 
0.7558* 
0.0762 
0.2088* 
0.0809 
0.1884** 
0.0286 
0.1945** 
0.0262 
0.1934** 
0.0244 
ROE 
Return on Equity 
 -0.2009 
0.3802 
-0.2886 
0.6275 
-0.1203 
0.5761 
0.1384 
0.8832 
-0.4552 
0.5510 
-0.1486 
0.5920 
-0.1014 
0.6245 
-0.0970 
0.6407 
-0.0937 
0.6520 
TURN 
Asset Turnover 
 0.3558* 
0.0690 
-0.2103 
0.6417 
0.2406 
0.1815 
-0.0026 
0.9970 
1.3770* 
0.0955 
0.2679 
0.2347 
0.1655 
0.2741 
0.1495 
0.3217 
0.1494 
0.3189 
CR 
Current Ratio 
 -0.1825** 
0.0473 
-0.1437 
0.5705 
-0.1739** 
0.0475 
-0.2264 
0.5786 
-0.3398 
0.3501 
-0.1483 
0.1318 
-0.1457* 
0.0647 
-0.1384* 
0.0793 
-0.1407* 
0.0748 
LAW 
Legal Origin 
  -0.5328 
0.7123 
-2.8860** 
0.0422 
-2.2574 
0.2732 
 
 
 -0.6536 
0.5607 
-0.8828 
0.4358 
-1.2397 
0.1814 
INTRA 
Intrajurisdictional 
 3.6602*** 
0.0009 
-0.8400 
0.1459 
    1.0576*** 
0.0044 
1.0144*** 
0.0059 
1.0135*** 
0.0060 
BC 
Business Cycle 
 0.0553 
0.8960 
0.0741 
0.9280 
-0.0704 
0.8548 
1.2072 
0.4285 
-0.5663 
0.6732 
0.0237 
0.9600 
0.0500 
0.8899 
0.0338 
0.9246 
 
INTER 
Interest Rate 
 -0.1237 
0.1882 
-0.1402 
0.4919 
-0.0848 
0.3382 
-0.7236* 
0.0772 
0.0344 
0.9118 
-0.1454 
0.1703 
-0.1045 
0.1998 
-0.0893 
0.2687 
-0.0889 
0.1801 
TAX 
Taxation System  
  1.4385 
0.2752 
1.2088* 
0.0616 
-4.5304** 
0.0233 
  -0.0457 
0.9142 
-0.0552 
0.5030 
-0.2749 
0.5966 
CINDEX 
Corruption Index 
  -2.0204 
0.1097 
-4.1557** 
0.0407 
-1.2547 
0.4176 
  -1.4325** 
0.0426 
-0.6937 
0.5505 
-0.8491 
0.4523 
DISC 
Disclosure Index 
  -0.0342 
0.7708 
0.2360 
0.1590 
-0.2696 
0.2879 
  -0.4480 
0.4988 
-0.1273 
0.3963 
-0.0760 
0.4578 
Pseudo R
2
 
 
 0.3387 0.3374 0.2677 0.5014 0.4600 0.2894 0.2344 0.2302 0.2297 
N  358 137 398 97 49 246 495 495 495 
 
***, **, and * denote a statistically significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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